Brexit and support for anti-establishment insurgencies suggest that British politics is moving away from the old left-right opposition towards a new divide between the defenders and detractors of progressive liberalism. As the essay suggests, progressive liberalism differs significantly from both classical and new liberalism. It fuses free-market economics with social egalitarianism and identity politics. Both the hard left and the radical right reject this combination and want to undo a number of liberal achievements. British politics is also moving in a post-liberal direction. In the economy, post-liberalism signals a shift from rampant market capitalism to economic justice and reciprocity. In society, it signals a shift from individualism and egalitarianism to social solidarity and fraternal relations. And politically, it signals a shift from the minority politics of vested interests and group identity to a majority politics based on a balance of interests, shared identity and the embedding of state and market in the intermediary institutions of civil society. This essay argues that post-liberalism is redefining BritainÕs political centre-ground in an age where neither progressive liberalism nor reactionary anti-liberalism commands majority support. First, it charts the ascendancy of progressive liberalism over the past quarter-century. Second, it contrasts anti-liberal reactions with post-liberal alternatives before exploring why earlier iterations of post-liberalism failed to gain traction with the political mainstream. Third, it provides a discussion and critique of Theresa MayÕs post-liberal conservatism, notably the tension between free-market globalisation and free trade on the one hand, and the support for national industry and the indigenous working class, on the other hand. In an age of economic and cultural insecurity, the liberal-progressive consensus is breaking down. The extremes on the left and the right are resurgent, and each rejects one side of progressive liberalism. The hard left wants to replace market fundamentalism with a statist
economy, whereas the radical right seeks to roll back social egalitarianism in favour of nationalism and even atavistic ethno-centrism.
There are also signs that British politics is moving in a post-liberal direction, rejecting the economic and social liberalism that has been dominant for the past four decades. In the economy, post-liberalism signals a shift from rampant market capitalism to economic justice and reciprocity. In society, it signals a shift from individualism and egalitarianism to social solidarity and fraternal relations. And politically, it signals a shift from the minority politics of vested interests and group identity to a majority politics based on a balance of interests and shared identity. Linking post-liberalism together is an emphasis on the embedding of state and market in the intermediary institutions of civil society, which give people agency Ð professional associations, profit-sharing businesses, trade unions, universities, ecological groups and devolved government. These are still early days, but MayÕs speeches, both before and after becoming prime minister, are unified by post-liberal thinking [É] Brexit is in part a revolt against a set of characteristics of modern liberalism. We have a new political agenda that no political party can afford to ignore. Whether we consider ourselves liberal or not, we increasingly inhabit post-liberal times. 3 This essay argues that post-liberalism is redefining BritainÕs political centre-ground in an age where neither progressive liberalism nor reactionary anti-liberalism commands majority support. First, it charts the ascendancy of progressive liberalism over the past quarter-century.
Second, it contrasts anti-liberal reactions with post-liberal alternatives before exploring why earlier iterations of post-liberalism failed to gain traction with the political mainstream. Third, it provides a discussion and critique of Theresa MayÕs post-liberal conservatism, notably the tension between free-market globalisation and free trade on the one hand, and the support for national industry and the indigenous working class, on the other hand.
The rise and rise of progressive liberalism
The origins of post-liberalism can be traced to the crisis of the two models that have been dominant since 1945. First, the post-war settlement of Ôembedded liberalismÕ that was regulated by Keynesian economics of full employment and demand management. Secondly, the post-1970s settlement of Ôneo-liberalismÕ that was driven by Hayekian economics of controlling inflation and enacting supply-side reforms. Both models were modernising projects that viewed state and market as the key institutions to govern society. Whereas the first model focused on the administrative state to control from the top down hitherto more mutual arrangements, the second model shifted the emphasis to the free market as the main mode of social organisation.
Both provided greater freedoms and opportunities, but they also reinforced the dual effect of disembedding politics and the economy from society and embedding social bonds in power relations and transactional ties, to use Karl PolanyiÕs terminology. 4 Just as liberalism in its progressive adaptation became increasingly associated with the twin forces of state and market, post-liberalism (as I will suggest) focuses on the primacy of society Ð the social bonds and civic ties that provide relationships of reciprocity.
Starting in the 1990s with Bill ClintonÕs Ônew centerÕ and Tony BlairÕs Ôthird wayÕ, progressive politics took modernisation to the next level by fusing state bureaucracy with market exchange: private providers were invited to deliver key public services, and the state expanded its influence into new areas of the private sector and private sphere through novel forms of regulation and surveillance (however supposedly Ôlight-touchÕ). This fusion led to new paradoxical phenomena such as the market-state that seeks to reshape Ôautonomous social institutions as bureaucratic replicas of business enterprisesÕ. 5 In the process New Secondly, the hard left and the radical right also argue for much more central state intervention that undermines the freedom to associate and build intermediary institutions.
Thirdly, both make use of demagogical, fact-free manipulation of emotion and appeal to the supposed will of ÔThe PeopleÕ in ways that are reminiscent of 1930s authoritarianism. And, fourthly, both promote a plebiscite populism that locks politics into a dialectical movement between empty theatrics and the power of oligarchy old or new. 9 There is thus a double convergence at work in British politics: just as the three main parties One key difference with the early post-liberalism of the Big Society and One-Nation Labour is that May seems prepared underpin her rhetorical commitment to greater economic justice and social cohesion with a more explicit political economy. It does not so much intend to offer mere compensation for the side-effects of globalisation as to provide fundamental reforms which would begin to change the nature of the market itself. One example is the aligning of executive pay with the companyÕs long-term performance and the interests of its shareholders, employees and consumers Ð as outlined in the governmentÕs corporate governance review.
May also appears to reject the liberal triumph of market selfishness over shared prosperity and has pledges to deploy an active state and legal system in order to help shape an economy at the service of society: ÔWe donÕt hate the state, we value the role that only the state can The latter example highlights the tensions that beset MayÕs attempt to implement a postliberal agenda. The decision of this erstwhile Remainer to go along with a Ôhard BrexitÕ (exit from the EUÕs single market and the customs union), so leaving her free to pursue a OneNation post-liberal conservatism at home, looks set to run into contradictions. Already, her preparedness to sacrifice the free market in labour to protect borders is facing opposition from those Tories who are perfectly happy about immigration benefitting big business, but wish for even more deregulated trade than EU membership will allow.
Unrestricted free trade on the global market without regional customs tariff agreements as provided by the EU is likely to hurt the very workers that May claims to defend when she speaks of a Ôcountry that works not for a privileged few, but for every one of usÕ. 13 They seem for the moment to be reassured by promised restrictions on immigration, but may become less so if these restrictions fail to materialise and higher inflation because of a weaker Sterling leads to a further fall in their living standards. Moreover, a recourse to low-tax and lowregulation standards, combined with support for the most uninhibited global exponents of financial and business practice in the City of London, is incompatible with the forging of a domestic social market. Nor, given the current trajectory of globalisation, is it easy to achieve this in one country acting alone. Nor does a concern for merit shape MayÕs economic strategy. The governmentÕs green paper on industrial policy correctly identifies regional inequalities in relation to productivity and innovation, but the proposed focus on greater specialisation in cutting-edge high-tech sectors fails to address the question of how to renew more traditional sectors and build local supply chains in support of people and communities where they are. What is missing is a
Conservative challenge to the power of centralised finance in the City of London combined with a determination to build a network of both sectoral and regional banks that can channel capital into the productive activities of small-and medium enterprise. Fundamentally, MayÕs government has so far not translated the aspiration of greater economic justice into concrete, transformative action.
Herein lies a deeper philosophical problem with MayÕs version of meritocracy, which is narrowly focused on trying to increase both economic growth and boost social mobility.
Higher growth of an imbalanced economy will only serve to increase inequality and a growing sense of injustice about a system that is rigged in favour of certain sectors and groups. Moreover, social mobility involves both winners and losers and therefore undermines
MayÕs promise to Ôbuild a country that works for everyoneÕ. The twin emphasis on growth and social mobility suggests that MayÕs conservative post-liberalism rests more on increasing equality of opportunity, which benefits those coming from families with wealth and connections, than it does on recognising merit based on different talents and vocations.
State support for upward mobility fails to recognise that most people will never ÔwinÕ, or Even more fundamentally, the problem with MayÕs version of meritocracy is that it focuses exclusively on the best and the brightest, as Michael Young already foresaw in 1958 when coining the term. 16 Leaving aside the sheer complexity of identifying the most able, such a focus risks reinforcing a dangerous resentment amongst the many who carry out necessary but unglamorous tasks, and remain rooted in one place (underscored by the Brexit vote). MayÕs purported commitment to building a Ôshared societyÕ has little to say about how not just the state but also the market and the intermediary institutions of civil society can afford adequate, comfortable provision and a sense of dignity and respect consequent upon appreciation for their service. There is, in other words, a contradiction between the economic modernisation of Global Britain and greater national solidarity.
In turn, this argument takes us back full circle to MayÕs post-liberal political economy. Her emphasis on greater popular participation in the sharing on assets such as housing and more worker involvement in the running of companies suggests that her proposed alternative to economic liberalism is (with much present irony) a more continental European system of company governance and ethos, which favours mutual benefit over an Anglo-Saxon Ôwinner-takes-allÕ mentality. The test of MayÕs post-liberalism will then be whether she can avoid either liberal economics or liberal statism by forging a social market. A purely buccaneering approach to Europe and the agenda of a Global Britain based on free trade is likely to ensure a backsliding in a neo-liberal direction. The failure to build a strong social and economic settlement at home will weaken BritainÕs ability to shape a new global economy that benefits those who are experiencing economic and cultural insecurity.
A new post-liberal centre-ground
In one sense, politics seems to revert to the binary opposite between left and right, as a 
